The authors investigate the decision of municipal governments to outsource the provision of public services during the 1980s and 1990s-a period of increased responsibility for municipalities. This study extends previous empirical work on outsourcing by distinguishing the type of outsourcing used (e.g., public, private, or other types of providers) and treating the outsourcing decision as a dynamic choice. Institutional characteristics and fiscal stress are found to play an important role in explaining service choices. Multinomial logistic regressions indicate that outsourcing was more common for poor cities than for wealthier ones, with the former often relying on government agencies and the latter opting for privatization. Throughout time, these choices are likely to reinforce interjurisdictional patterns of disparity in service quality and costs.
arrangements . . . transform citizens from passive consumers to active participants in community affairs." The increasing fiscal pressures facing many local governments arguably have resulted in increased reliance on alternative forms of service provision and production, raising profound issues regarding the potential tradeoffs among effectiveness, efficiency, equity, and accountability. An empirical literature spanning more than two decades has produced varying findings regarding the determinants of service production arrangements, in no small part due to measurement and modeling complexities. These include poor measurement of service choices, reliance on crosssectional data, and issues of model misspecification.
We contribute to the empirical literature regarding service production choices by addressing a number of these modeling and measurement concerns and testing an intrametropolitan model of the determinants of service production choices. These service provision choices are analyzed in the Southern California regional context to investigate the effects on contracting choices of sociospatial patterns of economic and fiscal disparity while holding constant factors related to market structure and state-level fiscal constitution. Our findings suggest that poor cities, which often face high fiscal stress associated with poverty and competitive pressure from surrounding areas, were more likely to experiment with outsourcing, especially in the 1980s. They were, however, less likely to opt for the privatization of services but instead chose to outsource services to other governments by either contracting with public service agencies or relying on special districts for provision. In contrast, wealthier suburban cities privatized a significant number of services, giving them the ability to reduce their fiscal burden or shift it to the private market.
In the section that follows, we discuss previous empirical work regarding the determinants of municipal service production. We then turn to patterns of municipal service choice in the Southern California region to illustrate the extent to which these have changed during the past two decades. In the second part of the article, we focus specifically on the decision by cities to subcontract and on the choice among alternative types of contractual arrangements (i.e., public, private, or other). Finally, we present conclusions and implications of our results.
THE DETERMINANTS OF MUNICIPAL SERVICE PRODUCTION
Whereas many studies have addressed the "make or buy" decision regarding the production of local government services, the literature has produced varying and often contradictory results (Boyne 1998a (Boyne , 1998b . This is in no small part due to the difficulty of developing a testable model of local government service choice. The general specification of such models is that choice of service production arrangement (e.g., in-house or contracted out) is related to supply, demand, and institutional variables.
From the supply side, it is typical to include measures of population and market structure to measure the likelihood of cost savings due to achieving economies of scale and the advantages of increased competition (Greene 1996; Benton and Menzel 1992; Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Ferris 1986) . Typically, scale is measured by population, and market structure by means of a categorical variable to indicate whether a city is located within a metropolitan area. As Boyne (1998a) discusses, measures of population have produced equivocal results, which he attributes to measurement problems such as the difficulty of parsing out the distinct effects of metropolitan location and size. Boyne also argues that population size may be picking up the pattern of municipal service responsibilities rather than scale (larger cities nationally are more likely to have the responsibility for redistributive types of services).
It is also possible that these results are due to sample truncation. Studies typically rely on data from International City and County Management Association surveys (e.g., Greene 1996; Ferris 1986; Ferris and Graddy 1986) , which may have two problems: many cities of fewer than 10,000 in population are excluded, and there may be problems of sampling bias due to attrition. 1 Given that the local public finance literature suggests that economies of scale for many services are exhausted at a population approaching 50,000 (Hirsch 1995) , there may be insufficient variation on the low end to achieve robust results in most models.
Another supply-side issue is how to operationalize the rich variety of alternative providers that governments may tap-private agencies, whether for-profit agencies, nonprofit agencies, agency partnerships, leasing arrangements, and other governmental providers. Analyses of supply options have been hampered by poor measures of the dependent variable, choice of service production. Typically, the dependent measure of "local government choice" is measured as either the production technology used for a particular service (e.g., whether sanitation services are contracted out; see, e.g., Hirsch 1995) or a count of the number of services that are produced in-house (a classic study being Ferris [1986] ). These measures do not account for the options of supply (e.g., other governments and private providers), nor do they accurately measure the fiscal impact of total contracting-out decisions.
From the demand side, most studies attempt to account for the influence of local service preferences, which is typically measured through proxy sociodemographic measures. It is common, for example, to include measures such as the percentage of the population that is Black or elderly, under the presumption that these groups would have higher preferences for public services and hence would likely resist attempts to control costs by contracting out (Ferris 1986; Morgan, Hirlinger, and England 1988) . These proxy measures make it difficult to isolate causal factors. For example, as Greene (1996) discusses, wealthier individuals are more likely to be politically involved and conservative, factors that would make them more likely to prefer and be able to advocate for service reduction.
It is commonly supposed that demands for contracting out for service provision arise due to fiscal stress, although some studies have found the opposite: that greater fiscal stress is associated with lower levels of contracting (Greene 1996) . Again, these inconsistent results are possibly due to theoretical and methodological difficulties in operationalizing the concept of fiscal stress. Previous empirical studies typically have used such measures as tax burden, proportion of revenues from intergovernmental grants, and the existence of tax limitations or other fiscal constraints. As Ladd and Yinger (1989) discuss, tax burden is a poor proxy for fiscal capacity because it does not reflect the ability of localities to leverage local resources given the pressures of intergovernmental competition.
The demand for alternative forms of service provision is also conditioned on the nature of the service. As discussed in Ferris and Graddy (1986) , outsourcing a local service can reduce costs of service provision but at the same time can result in loss of administrative control and reduced ability to achieve distributive aims by targeting services to particular groups. The extent to which administrative control is important varies by service type and relates to such factors as the possibility of moral hazard, whether the good has a collective rather than individual character, the extent to which standardization is perceived to be important, and the potential for problems associated with service disruption. It is also clear that economies of scale are exhausted at a much lower level for some services (such as planning or police) than for others (solid waste collection or sewers).
With the exception of Ferris and Graddy (1986) , the literature typically relies on categorical data to describe services, and these data do not permit analysis of differences between services (some of which are more readily contracted out than others) or the magnitude of contracting out vis-à-vis the overall city fiscal resources. This article responds to Ferris and Graddy's call for a two-stage multivariate analysis of the factors influencing both the choice to outsource particular services and the choice of sector for service provision.
Institutional and political factors also arguably influence decisions about service provision arrangements. The existence of strong public employee unions is perhaps the most powerful constraint on the ability to contract out. These unions are more likely to hold sway in older chartered cities, which tend to be more politicized. In addition, institutional structure arguably plays a role. For example, in a survey of 1,400 suburban municipalities, Ruhil et al. (1999) found that the most critical determinant of a city undertaking "reinvention" reforms such as contracting out was the presence of a city manager. Such city managers may serve as managerial entrepreneurs, and they may also signal a reform-type government structure that is more efficiency oriented and resistant to political pressure.
Finally, a serious limitation in the literature is that most studies of service choice specify regression models with some indicator of the proportion of activities outsourced at a given time as the dependent variable to be explained by characteristics in the same time period (Greene 1996; Benton and Menzel 1992; Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Ferris 1986 ). As Boyne (1998a) discusses, such measures introduce model misspecification because the dependent variable does not measure a dynamic choice of service production technology but rather the current status of service production, which may relate to historical rather than contemporary characteristics of the city. In addition, such models cannot properly be interpreted as measuring the decision to outsource the production of public services. To understand why cities choose to adopt new methods of service provision, one needs to analyze the period when the change occurred-that is, when the choice of outsourcing was made (Boyne 1998a) .
Our analysis extends the empirical work by providing a more textured analysis of service types and addressing a number of the methodological limitations of previous work. We analyze changes in service production for each of 11 municipal services, considering whether the service is provided by the city or by another public agency, a private firm, a mix of providers, or others, including volunteers, nonprofits, and leasing arrangements.
2 This detailed information allows for a more refined analysis of municipal choice than one based on a simple distinction between services provided in-house or contracted out. In addition, we examine the dynamic aspects of service choice in two ways. First, we discuss the service production choices made by newly formed cities. During the period we examine, 17 communities formed new cities through the process of municipal incorporation, a process that permitted city founders to decide whether to provide services in-house, contract with the county, or use some other form of outsourcing. Second, we use panel data to examine the extent to which cities changed service production arrangements between 1982 and 1997, allowing us to document and explain changes in service delivery during a 15-year time period and to analyze the factors that influenced the choice to "make or buy."
Because our study focuses on a single metropolitan area, Los Angeles, it holds constant both the pattern of municipal services (all cities in California provide the same general pattern of services) and market structure (all cities are within the same metropolitan market). These controls enable us to use population as a proxy for economies of scale, which we model using a parabolic measure, assuming a U-shaped relationship between population and costs, consistent with other studies (Rubinfeld 1987; Ladd and Yinger 1989; Hirsch 1965 ). In addition, we include data for all cities in the region, which range from the very small (e.g., Irwindale, Indian Wells, and Hidden Hills, with populations fewer than 2,000 in 1980) to Los Angeles (with a population in excess of 3 million).
Our model includes a variety of fiscal measures, including per capita sales, per capita property taxes, and intergovernmental grants. We use a more refined measure of fiscal capacity that reflects how much revenue a city would bring in were it to impose the region's average taxation rate across the resource base of the city. This index is similar to that used by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and Ladd and Yinger (1989) , but relates only to the portion of revenues over which cities have discretionary control (e.g., fees and user charges, special assessment, and other taxing sources). Given that federal expenditures to cities may alleviate the fiscal responsibilities of cities and influence their choice of service provision arrangement, we also include measures of federal per capita redistributive and other federal expenditures by city (see Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2001, 166) .
Although we include demographic characteristics to examine demand, we also include a more direct measure of political preferences as measured by voter registration, with the expectation that populations with more conservative ideological leanings are more likely to support privatization. We have also included an institutional variable, namely, whether a city is a general law or charter city. In California, general law cities are governed by a council/ manager form of government and, consequently, are likely to be less politicized than charter cities, many of which incorporate a strong mayor form of government.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This article focuses on service provision choices made by cities in the five-county region of Southern California (i.e., Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and Ventura) between 1982 and 1997, a period during which many local governments experienced increasing fiscal stress. As dis-cussed in more detail elsewhere, during the study period fiscal disparities in the region increased, requiring the older industrial suburbs and a number of newly developing jurisdictions to face the high costs of population growth with greatly constrained fiscal bases (Musso 2004; Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2001; Wolch et al. 2004) . Fiscal disparities in the region are related to its large number of municipalities, which increased from 153 in 1982 to 174 in 1997, as well as jurisdictional variation in socioeconomic, fiscal, and institutional characteristics. This diversity and the region's history in experimenting with new types of service provision make it a particularly good case for studying service choices. Moreover, the large number of cities within the metropolitan area allow for an empirical analysis that holds regional and state-specific factors constant while highlighting potential intrametropolitan dynamics.
Data were obtained from the State of California Controller's Office on service provision arrangements for 1982, 1990, and 1997 . For each of 11 municipal services, the data report whether the service is provided by the city, through a contract with a public agency or a private firm, by another independent public agency such as a special district, or via a mix of providers including volunteers, nonprofits, and leasing arrangements. 3 This detailed information allows for a more refined analysis of municipal choice than one based on a simple distinction between services provided in-house or contracted out. We first computed two indices of outsourcing for each period: one unweighted, the other weighted by expenditure levels. The unweighted index reflects the proportion of city services not provided in-house and is comparable to indices used in earlier studies of service provision (Greene 1996; Benton and Menzel 1992; Morgan and Hirlinger 1991; Ferris 1986 ). The weighted index measures the share of public expenditures allocated to services not provided in-house. This index is an improved indicator of outsourcing because it takes into account the relative financial importance of each activity. For example, some services, such as police and fire protection, represent a larger proportion of local expenditures than do others such as emergency services, public transportation, and libraries. The weights were derived from expenditure data taken from the same source.
To capture the choice of service provision, we created a new data set in which each service represents a unique observation. Thus, for 1982, we have 153 cities with 11 services, giving us a sample size of 1,683. Because of new incorporations, this size increased to 1,848 (i.e., 168 cities) in 1990 and 1,870 (i.e., 170 cities) in 1997. Using these three sets of data, we computed a choice variable by looking at changes in the type of service provision used between 1982 and 1990 and between 1990 and 1997 . Because we are concerned with changes from in-house provision to other types of arrangements, and because there was virtually no movement in the other direction, we limited our sample to services that were provided in-house in the original period of either 1982 or 1990. The value of the choice variable was set to 0 when there were no changes in the service provision during the period (i.e., if the service continued to be provided in-house). The value was set to 1 if provision of the service had been changed to a contract with a public agency, 2 if it had been transferred to the private sector, 3 if it had been switched to an independent public agency, and 4 if it had been moved to mixed arrangements or alternative solutions like volunteers.
The 1982-1990 and 1990-1997 data sets with the choice variables and a number of potential explanatory variables discussed below were then combined into one large data set with a dummy reflecting the period when the change in service provision choice was measured. The final sample size is 1,346. In an attempt to explain the change of service provision arrangements, we computed a number of city-level fiscal, institutional/political, and demographic characteristics. To limit endogeneity problems, we used 1980 variables to explain 1982-1990 changes, and 1990 variables for 1990-1997 changes. 'Financial Transactions (1982 , 1997 were also used to compute indicators of fiscal capacity. Because Proposition 13 has limited the ability of cities to raise revenues through property taxes and increased the importance of other sources of revenues such as user fees and sales taxes, it is important to distinguish among different components of fiscal capacity (Joassart-Marcelli and Musso 2001) . Because local governments have limited control over property and sales taxes, as well as intergovernmental revenue, we consider these as given and use city per capita figures for these three components of fiscal capacity. We computed a per capita index of discretionary local fiscal capacity, which reflects how much revenue a city would raise if it were to impose the region's average taxation rate for other sources of revenues. This index is similar to that used by the ACIR and Ladd and Yinger (1989) but relates only to the portion of revenues over which cities have discretionary control (e.g., fees and user charges, special assessment, and other taxing sources). These fiscal capacity indicators were computed for 1982 and 1990-years preceding the changes in service provisions and thus more likely to influence provision choices.
Sources of revenues from the State of California Controller's Office Reports on Cities
We measure federal expenditures on cities using data computed from the Consolidated Federal Funds Reports (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983-1991). These variables were computed as annual averages for 1983-1985 and 1989-1991, corresponding Our model of discrete choice is a multinomial logistic regression analyzing the provision arrangement, whether subcontracting services to a public provider or private firm, shifting the responsibility to another government agency, or using mixed strategies. The reference group is services that remain provided in-house. As Train (2003) describes, a number of models can be used to analyze discrete choices including logit, nested logit, probit, and other generalized extreme value (GEV) models. The multinomial logit model is commonly used when dealing with more than two alternative choices and using individual specific independent variables instead of choicespecific ones. It assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)-the fact that odds ratios of any two choices are the same no matter what other alternatives are available or what the attributes of the other alternatives might be (Train 2003, 50) . When this assumption does not hold, multinomial probit, nested logit, or other GEV models must be used to allow for variations in the substitution patterns across alternatives.
Given the politically reactive character of public choice in an urban area (Yates 1980) , we see no reason to assume a priori that the choice to outsource precedes the choice of provider. Moreover, the complexity of such models, especially when using individual-specific (i.e., city-level) variables that do not vary across choices, has led researchers to recommend using the more common multinomial logit (Whitten and Palmer 1996, 259) . We performed a Hausman test of the IIA hypothesis based on the regression reported in Table 1 and found insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of independence, giving us some confidence in the use of a multinomial logit model (Hausman and McFadden 1984) . 5 We should note that the restriction of our analysis to a region of California inevitably introduces a tradeoff between validity and generalizability of results. We would argue that this choice enables a more valid model because we are able to hold constant a number of variables that are difficult to measure in cross-state studies, most notably fiscal institutions and regional labor markets. At the same time, our results are most generalizable to regions that share many of the characteristics of Southern California: southwestern regions with fragmented institutional structures, fiscal constraints, and service economies characterized by relatively high degrees of socioeconomic inequality.
SERVICE PROVISION ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA CITIES
As is true for most American cities, the proportion of services provided directly by local governments in Southern California fell between 1982 and 1990. It also declined in the second period, although at a much lower rate. Figure 1 shows the proportion of public services provided by each type of provision mechanism, weighted by their share of city expenditures. Although most services remain directly provided by local governments, the share supplied by other institutional arrangements was higher in 1990. Outsourcing tended to be dominated by contracts with other levels of governments as well as a complete relinquishing of the function to another independent government agency. Whereas the former implies some degree of competition among government providers and the possibility of breaking or renegotiating the contract, the latter is more monopolistic in the sense that the city gives up the production of public services to noncompetitive agencies such as special districts or county governments. The first case can be illustrated by the example of a city contracting with a neighboring community to provide emergency services. The latter can be exemplified by the case of cities not having their own water or sewer department but instead relying on a special district. Surprisingly, given the focus on privatization during this period, reliance on contracts with the private market has remained limited, rising slowly from 6.32% in 1982 to 8.14% in 1997.
The rising importance of arrangements with other levels of government is no doubt linked to the role that counties have played providing services to a number of recently incorporated contract cities in the region (see Miller [1981] for a historical discussion of contract cities in Southern California). Between 1982 and 1997, 17 new cities were incorporated in southern California and began providing services to their new residents. Figure 2 contrasts service provision arrangements for newly formed cities and those that incorporated prior to 1982. For the overwhelming majority of services, newly incorporated cities adopted contracts with other governments (especially for police and fire protection) or simply left the responsibility to other independent government agencies (typically for sewer, water, library, and transportation services). Indeed, only 4% of services were provided in-house-most of which related to planning-compared to almost half of services for older cities.
It is interesting to note that the unweighted numbers, which simply reflect the proportion of activities provided by each type of arrangement, show a greater proportion of services provided by private firms and other arrange- ments than do the weighted numbers (see Table 2 ). For example, in 1997, 56% of services provided were subcontracted according to the weighted sample, compared to 62% when using the unweighted sample-a significant difference. This indicates that a number of financially less important services may be provided by these arrangements, whereas those that represent a larger share of the budget tend to remain in the hands of governments. This would suggest that one should view with caution results from the many studies that use unweighted indices to measure the contracting out of public services. Figure 3 provides outsourcing information for each type of service, illustrating a high degree of variation based on the nature of the service. Although it appears to be quite common to outsource the provision of solid waste disposal, public transportation, and emergency services, cities are substantially less likely to relinquish control over planning decisions, parks and recreation, or police and fire protection. Figure 4 shows that the type of arrangement on which cities relied in 1997 varied dramatically depending on the type of services to be provided. For instance, planning and parks and recreation were for the most part provided in-house, and solid waste disposal tended to be dominated by private contracts, whereas public transportation was often provided by other independent government agencies such as the Metropolitan Transit Authority. When services like police or fire protection were not provided in-house, they were almost always supplied through a contract with other governments (typically, county governments) but not by the private sector. cities have increasingly abandoned library services and relied on independent governmental units to provide them. During the past 15 years, some changes occurred in the type of provision mechanism used for various services (not shown). Fire services represented 30% of the services that were switched to a contracted public provider (mostly county). Most privatization occurred in lighting, planning, garbage disposal, sewer, and parks and recreation services. Transition to other independent public agencies (such as special districts) primarily involved sewer and water services. Parks and recreation services have become increasingly dependent on volunteers. In none of the periods studied did any city provide all of its services inhouse. There was always at least one public service contracted out to other providers. For example, the cities of Glendale and Inglewood provide all but one of their services in-house (i.e., transportation in Glendale and garbage collection in Inglewood are provided through contracts with private firms). In contrast, many suburban cities that incorporated following Proposition 13 contract virtually all services with county government (see Figure 2 , above).
The geographical variations of service provision choices are illustrated in Figure 5 . The map shows the number of public services that were outsourced during the 1982-1997 period by city. Although no simple pattern can be identified, outsourcing appears to prevail in suburban counties, especially in Riverside and San Bernardino Counties where a large number of newer cities have chosen not to rely heavily on in-house production of services. Similarly, many of the very poor cities in the southeastern part of Los Angeles County, as well as older and wealthier suburban municipalities in Orange County, show a relatively high propensity to outsource their provision of public services. Cities with a lower level of changes were typically older, such as those in the center and west of Los Angeles County, and in the northwest of Orange County. The map hints at the complexity of service provision choices and underscores the importance of investigating a variety of factors influencing them.
EXPLAINING CHANGES IN SERVICE PROVISION
The type of arrangement in use at a given point in time may have been adopted decades earlier and, thus, cannot be explained by contemporary characteristics (Boyne 1998a, 160) . Therefore, in the rest of this article, we focus only on services that were provided in-house in 1982 and/or 1990, and we analyze the factors influencing production choices by 1997. Hence, this only includes cities that were incorporated prior to 1982; as discussed above, newly incorporated cities rely heavily on contracting. During the combined period of 1982 to 1997, a total of 1,333 services were provided in-house initially. Among these, 1,198 (89%) continued to be provided in-house, 47 (3.49%) were switched to public contractors, 49 (3.64%) were privatized, 39 (2.90%) were moved to other levels of governments, and 13 (0.97%) were later produced with mixed strategies. Again, rhetoric about privatization notwithstanding, service production technology remained relatively stable during the 15-year time period, suggesting potential "path dependency"-that institutional arrangements are adopted for idiosyncratic reasons and tend to remain in place even if inefficient (Mokyr 1990) . Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for cities in our sample. It summarizes the characteristics of cities that provided a service in-house in 1982 and/ or 1990, and either continued to do so in subsequent years or changed it to other means of provision such as public or private contractors, other public agencies, or mixed. Interestingly, although there were no large differences across cities based on demographic characteristics, we find that services were more often privatized in cities with more children, fewer elderly residents, more foreign-born residents, and higher levels of poverty. Institutional and political variables varied across cities relying on different types of service provision. Typically, we find a greater incidence of outsourcing among younger, smaller, suburban cities, those that are governed under the state's general law provisions by a city manager, and those that have a more conservative voting population. This is not surprising because older cities with a tradition of public service might face higher political opposition to the privatization or subcontracting of services to other entities than would cities with weaker political institutions and a more conservative electorate. In contrast, recently incorporated cities often begin their public life by contracting many services (including police and fire protection) with counties. These so-called contract cities may find it politically and organizationally easier to outsource additional services at a later date. This also explains why suburban cities tend to rely more heavily on public providers (either directly or via a contract) rather than on private firms. Larger cities may also be able to benefit from economies of scale in providing services in-house and may feel less pressure to outsource than do smaller cities. 6 In general, cities that used alternative forms of service production tended to have lower fiscal capacity and to receive less funds from intergovernmen- tal grants and lower direct federal expenditures, although there is a large degree of variation among such cities. This confirms the view that outsourcing is a way of coping with fiscal stress, some of which can be linked to larger dependent populations and higher levels of poverty. It is also interesting to note that although few cities used mixed strategies, those who did were typically worse off fiscally. As discussed in Figure 4 , there are important differences in service arrangements across service types. Likewise, changes in provision mechanisms are influenced by the type of service under consideration. Although garbage disposal has often been privatized in the past 15 years, police, fire protection, and emergency services are less likely to be transferred to the private sector but instead tend to be switched to a contracted public provider. Transition to other public agencies such as special districts has been most characteristic of water and sewer services. Finally, little change involved planning and parks and recreation, which have for the most part remained in-house. These findings support the work of Ferris and Graddy (1986) , suggesting that the type of service provided, as well as fiscal and institutional variables, are strong determinants of service provision arrangements adopted by cities. We now turn to our multivariate model of the decision to subcontract.
CHOICES OF SERVICE PROVISION
To model choices of service provision, we proceed in two steps. In the first step, we use a logistic regression to analyze the decision whether to outsource the service or to continue producing it in-house. In the second step, we rely on multinomial logistic regression to analyze the different choices made by cities that originally provided the service in-house. Table 4 provides the regression results for the first model. They indicate that a number of variables play an important role in determining whether a service is outsourced. Among the demographic variables, the poverty rate of a city seems to be important in promoting the outsourcing of some services. This suggests that poor cities, which face high demands for public services, may experiment with new methods of provision in an attempt to cut costs, and it supports earlier research suggesting that fiscal stress is positively associated with outsourcing.
Among the political/institutional factors, the level of political activity and tradition of a city, reflected in being governed by a charter rather than by state general law, reduces the likelihood of outsourcing. Although suburban, younger cities that already have a high degree of outsourcing appear more likely to stop providing a service in-house, the results are not significant. The transfer of a service to other providers was more likely to occur in the 1982-1990 period than in the second time period, suggesting that outsourcing was an adjustment to the fiscal effects of Proposition 13 during the decade immediately following its passage.
As found in previous studies (Ferris 1986; Morgan and Hirlinger 1991) , intergovernmental revenues seem to play an important role in maintaining the provision of services in-house. Intergovernmental grants reduce the perceived costs of services and thus give incentives to local governments to continue to provide services locally. Other fiscal variables do not seem to play a key role.
The most important factor in determining whether a service is subcontracted is the type of service under consideration. Not surprisingly, garbage disposal is the service most likely to be outsourced (Hirsch 1995) , followed closely by sewer, light, emergency, water, and fire services. This indicates that the benefits of outsourcing may be more significant for certain types of services. For instance, large economies of scale can be achieved by transferring the provision of garbage disposal from small cities to a larger private firm. Such economies may not occur in the provision of police services. Similarly, it may be more politically feasible to give up the production of street lighting than it is to give up planning or policing. Table 1 shows the results of a multinomial logistic regression analyzing the choices of subcontracting services to a public provider or private firm, shifting the responsibility to another government agency, or using mixed strategies. The reference group is services that remain provided in-house.
The results reported in Table 1 can be interpreted in two ways. Coefficients reflect the degree to which the impact of a given variable on the selected provision mechanism differs from the control group of services that remained provided in-house. They can also be compared across provision arrangement to see the relative impact of such variable on alternative choices. Poor cities are more likely to outsource services. Moreover, having a large share of population in poverty has a greater impact on the probability of contracting with another government than it does on other subcontracting mechanisms. In California, counties are often seen as providers of last resort. It may be that very poor cities are unable to pay for a private provider but instead contract with the county (or another neighboring jurisdiction) to obtain basic services. This strategy may be a result of the intense fiscal pressures and uncompensated costs associated with poverty concentration (Joassart-Marcelli, Musso, and Wolch forthcoming) .
Several points may relate to the political context within which outsourcing occurs. First, cities with a large proportion of foreign-born residents are more likely to have switched service to private providers, suggesting that this option may be more easily implemented in cities with more transient populations who are less likely to organize and "voice" support for public services. This point would appear to be reinforced by the finding that charter cities are less likely to rely on other government agencies. At the same time, the proportion of registered voters in the population has a positive effect on the probability of outsourcing, holding other factors constant. This suggests that to some extent, outsourcing may be a response to perceptions of voter preferences for greater efficiency of services. In sum, two different types of political voice may be working against one another: mobilization to support inhouse service provision and electoral pressures to privatize. The fiscal variables do not appear to play a very important role in the choice of outsourcing approach, except that cities with low property taxes are more likely to rely on public providers, and cities with low sales tax revenues and high levels of federal expenditures are more likely to privatize services.
The kind of service involved is one of the most important determinants of the type of outsourcing method adopted. For instance, cities were more likely to rely on public contracts for police and fire. Emergency services, light, garbage collection, and sewer were all more likely to be provided by outside sources and appear to have been prime candidates for privatization. This is especially true of garbage disposal, the classic example of privatization studies. Emergency services and sewers were more likely to be provided by public agencies than they were to be privatized.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
This article combined 1982, 1990 , and 1997 data on service provision and production choices among Southern California cities to analyze the decision to subcontract a service and the choice of alternative provision mechanisms. Unlike most previous studies, it provides a dynamic analysis of changes in service delivery, explaining them in terms of the socioeconomic and fiscal characteristics of cities at a time immediately preceding this change.
One of our most remarkable findings was the limited extent to which cities made changes in service provision or production during a 15-year period. This is particularly striking given that Southern California was a birthplace of the contracting movement (Miller 1981) and given the continuing fiscal stress that followed Proposition 13. It appears that service provision and production arrangements tend to be made at the time of city formation, and that political and institutional rigidity limit the extent to which arrangements subsequently are changed. This reflects the possibility of path dependency-the fact that technologies are adopted randomly but that these choices have longlasting impacts (Mokyr 1990 ). Our findings also support the importance of city managers in promoting contracting out (Ruhil et al. 1999) ; general law cities, governed by a council/manager form of government, are more likely to contract out than are charter cities.
When service arrangements were changed, it was less typical to contract out with the private sector and more common to engage another level of government, either through contracts with other public entities or by relinquishing the responsibility of service provision to independent government agencies such as special districts or counties. This is especially true for the services that represent a larger share of municipal budgets as well as those that are typically perceived as essential. Although these types of intergovernmental arrangements arguably enable small cities to capture scale economies, it is not clear that they promote other cost savings. For example, as Ferris and Graddy (1986) discuss, many of the efficiencies commonly attributed to contracting out result from sectoral differences such as cost-saving labor practices used by private contractors. 7 This would suggest that the efficiency enhancement associated with outsourcing in Southern California may be somewhat limited by virtue of its heavy reliance on intergovernmental contracting, particularly with counties.
Because our analysis also analyzes a range of different types of public services, we are able to conclude that some services, such as garbage disposal, sewer, and emergency response, are more likely to be outsourced than others, especially police. The choice of outsourcing approach also was highly dependent on the character of service, confirming the work of Ferris and Graddy (1986) . Cities prefer to use public agencies when contracting out for emergency services such as police and fire, perhaps due to concerns about disruption of service. Water and emergency services are more likely to be transferred to a public provider but are less likely to be privatized. Again, the efficiency advantages of relying on contracts with other government agencies are not clear, particularly for services such as police, in which production economies are likely to be exhausted at a relatively low scale. Moreover, as would suggest, contracting introduces issues related to oversight and accountability that would be of particular concern in the case of policing, in which such arrangements might further separate police from the community they serve.
Our analysis suggests that poor cities with weaker political institutions and lower fiscal resources were more likely to change service provision arrangements, especially in the 1980s. This reinforces the findings of previous studies that emphasize the role of fiscal stress and political institutions in promoting the outsourcing of public services. It contrasts with the findings of Greene (1996) that wealthier, suburban cities are more likely to contract out, which he attributes to their location within a well-developed market for public services, and the characteristics of residents (wealthier residents being more likely to be politically active and conservative). Thus, outsourcing appears to be a way in which poorer cities cope with the high fiscal stresses associated with poverty and competitive pressures from surrounding areas. These cities were, however, more likely to contract with county government or allow special districts to provide services than to contract with private entities. When wealthier cities contract out, they appear more likely to reduce costs through reliance on private market providers.
This study improves on the validity of previous empirical work by focusing on a specific region, hence, holding constant systemic factors such as regional economy, fiscal arrangements, and jurisdictional landscape. The cost of improved validity is somewhat more limited generalizability; these findings are more likely to apply to other large metropolitan areas in the southwestern United States, particularly those that also face municipal competition, fiscal disparities, decentralization, socioeconomic inequality, and rapid demographic change. Future research might consider a comparative regional study to test the applicability of our findings across regions.
In sum, our findings are important because they suggest that the service provision arrangements adopted by local governments are influenced by their fiscal and institutional characteristics and may in turn reinforce these conditions. For instance, if poor cities under high fiscal stress are more likely to rely on other governments to provide services, they will not gain the flexibility, innovation, and cost-saving benefits typically attributed to private contractors. Thus, the services they receive will continue to be more expensive and/or of lower quality than those available in wealthier suburban areas. As a result, firms and residents with greater mobility are likely to move out of the poorer areas, compounding these areas' fiscal problems and creating further pressure to adopt alternative methods of service provision.
NOTES
5. The Hausman-McFadden test requires researchers to estimate the model on the full set of alternatives as well as on specified subsets of alternatives. The IIA hypothesis holds if estimates are not statistically different between the two. If estimates differ, it indicates that removing alternatives influences the probability of selecting a given option. Under these conditions, it may be appropriate to use a nested logit which would "nest" substitutable options.
6. Although average population is significantly higher in cities that continued to provide services in-house during both periods, the standard deviation is quite high, indicating high variations in city sizes. This is partly driven by the City of Los Angeles, which has a population of well over 3 million. This also reflects the fact that economies of scale may be achieved at different population levels for each type of services. For instance, although the production of transportation services may require large numbers of users before reaching lower average total costs, this may not be the case for police protection or other services characterized by lower fixed capital costs.
7. Ferris (1988) found that private contracting reduced spending and employment but not wage levels. Stein (1990) also finds lower costs and spending levels associated with joint contracting with other governments, and argues that there is a need for additional research to address whether sectoral differences explain efficiency gains from contracting. 
